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I. INTRODUCTION 
West Africa is presently home to approximately 1.5 million 
acres of cocoa farmland, which subsequently produces 70% of the 
world’s current chocolate supply.1  Côte d’Ivoire, also known as 
the Ivory Coast, is one of the largest cocoa producing countries 
within West Africa.2  Between 1995 and 2011, the annual 
production of cocoa beans on the Ivory Coast increased by 
approximately 600,000 tons and by an additional 40% in the 
2013–2014 season.3  This increase was attributed to the 
expansion of cocoa farmland in response to land scarcity in 
traditional production areas.4  The Ivory Coast has faced, and 
still faces, significant deforestation and land degradation due to 
the large infestation of pests and diseases, early aging of 
unshaded trees, lack of access to credit and agricultural inputs, 
and lack of land ownership; conditions that have produced 
several virus outbreaks.5 
 
The increase of farmland and the need to control the 
deteriorating conditions have always created a demand for farm 
workers.6  Regrettably, more than 1.5 million cocoa farm 
workers in West Africa are currently children.7  These child 
workers are exposed to hazardous dust, flames, smoke, and 
chemicals, are required to utilize dangerous tools that they are 
not properly trained to use, and are subject to various forms of 
physically demanding work.8  In the early 2000s, the Ivorian 
government ratified the International Labour Organization’s 
Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action 
for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour 
 
1 Marius Wessel & P.M. Foluke Quist-Wessel, Cocoa Production in West 
Africa, a Review and Analysis of Recent Developments, 74–75 NJAS – 






7 SLAVE FREE CHOCOLATE, http://www.slavefreechocolate.org/ (last visited 
May 12, 2021). 
8 Cocoa Campaign – Background, INT’L LAB. RTS. F., 
https://laborrights.org/industries/cocoa (last visited May 12, 2021); 
phbalancedfilms, Contrasts: Things Kids Like, YOUTUBE, at 1:40 (Mar. 27, 
2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4a7p33UJ-Aw&feature=emb_title. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss2/4
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(Convention 182).9  Convention 182 provides that each member 
ratifying the Convention “shall take immediate and effective 
measures to secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst 
forms of child labour as a matter of urgency” and further 
specifies all forms and uses of child labor incorporated therein.10  
There are presently 187 countries that have ratified Convention 
182.11  In addition to Convention 182, United States 
Congressman Eliot Engel and former United States Senator 
Tom Harkin introduced the “Harkin-Engel Protocol.”12  The 
Harkin-Engel Protocol, also known as the “Cocoa Protocol,” is an 
international agreement that applies Convention 182’s purpose 
specifically to child labor occurring on cocoa farms.13  The 
Harkin-Engel Protocol is enforced through a designated timeline 
of goals and standards which are to be met by all corporations 
operating in any participating region and who knowingly receive 
their cocoa beans from farms that utilize child labor.14 
 
Although Convention 182 and The Harkin-Engel Protocol 
have resulted in a decrease of child labor, it remains to exist on 
the Ivory Coast, with food and beverage companies as the most 
common culprits.15  Specifically, in 2005, several international 
food and beverage companies failed to meet  Harken-Engel 
Protocol deadlines on the Ivorian cocoa farms that they 
utilized.16  As a result, the International Labor Rights Forum 
 
9 Alfred Babo, Child Labor in Cocoa-Growing Communities in Côte 
D’Ivoire: Ways to Implement International Standards in Local Communities, 
21 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 23, 25 (2014). 
10 Convention (No. 182) Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate 
Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour arts. 1, 3, June 
17, 1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161. 
11 Ratifications of C182 – Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 
(No. 182), INT’L LAB. ORG., 
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO::P1130
0_INSTRUMENT_ID:312327 (last visited May 11, 2021). 
12 The Harkin-Engel Protocol, SLAVE FREE CHOCOLATE, 




15 Id.; see SLAVE FREE CHOCOLATE, supra note 7, which highlights that 
“companies—including but not limited to Mars, Nestlé, Hershey, Cargill, 
Cadbury, and Barry Callebaut—have admitted accountability” of their 
involvement with child labor in cocoa production. 
16 Doe v. Nestle, S.A. (Nestle I), 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1064–67 (C.D. Cal. 
3
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(ILRF), an organization that combats our world’s problems of 
worker’s rights and labor standards, decided to take legal action 
against these companies.17  The ILRF partnered with several 
law firms across the nation, bringing forth causes of action under 
the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), the Torture Victim Protection Act 
(TVPA), and other state-related claims.18  At the time of 
publication, this lawsuit has endured sixteen years of litigation 
due to the various interpretations of the ATS during its 
pendency.19  The ILRF has refused to back down from this suit 
despite being sent back to the pleadings stage several times. 
 
Part II of this case note discusses the ATS, its legislative 
history, and the various noteworthy case law that has 
interpreted the statute over time.  Part III will discuss the scope 
of aiding and abetting liability for violations of international law 
and part IV will discuss the procedural history and legal 
reasoning behind the decisions of Doe v. Nestle, S.A. over the 
past sixteen years of litigation.  Finally, this note will conclude 
with a personal analysis and prediction regarding the next steps 
of this case. 
II. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
Interestingly, the Alien Tort Statute “lacks a ‘legislative 
history.’”20  Many legal scholars have referred to the statute’s 
historical origins as “murky” and have found it difficult to 
 
2010). 
17 See Nestle Still Doesn’t Get It, INT’L LAB. RTS. F.: NEWS BLOG (Jan. 18, 
2007), https://laborrights.org/blog/200701/nestle-still-doesnt-get-it, which 
demonstrates the ILRF’s involvement in the Nestle child labor issue in the 
Ivory Coast. For a full factual background of the lawsuit, see generally Nestle 
I, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1064–67. 
18 See Nestle I, F. Supp. 2d at 1062–63. The other state-related claims 
consisted of unjust enrichment, unfair competition, and other state-law 
prohibited activities. Id. at 1063; see CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 
2020). 
19 The initial lawsuit was filed on July 14, 2005, and the case has yet to 
be resolved at the time of this article’s publication. Nestle I, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 
1063; see Cargill, Inc. v. John DOE I, 141 S. Ct. 184 (2020); and Nestle U.S.A., 
Inc. v. John DOE I, 141 S. Ct. 188 (2020), wherein certiorari has been recently 
granted. 
20 William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A 
Response to the “Originalists”, 19 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 222 
(1996). 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss2/4
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determine First Congress’s exact intentions.21  As a result, 
scholarly inquiry is all we have to rely on.  Pre-ATS, the States 
retained full and independent sovereignty “in all matters not 
expressly delegated to Congress,” which left Congress only with 
the power to recommend certain actions be taken by the States.22  
This posed great difficulty in the area of international law 
because Congress’s lack of authority left them simply hoping 
that State governments would comply with our nation’s 
commitments under international law.23 
 
One of Congress’s many concerns regarded violations of the 
law of nations.24  At the time, the principal offenses against the 
law of nations were violations of safe-conduct, infringement of 
the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.25  Not only did Congress 
wish to prevent these offenses from occurring but it was also 
important that they maintain the nation’s reputation and 
commitments to foreign countries at such early stages of our 
country’s establishment;26 commitments State governments 
often ignored.27  When the new Constitution was enacted, 
Congress was finally given the power to do what it could only 
previously recommend to the States regarding violations of the 
law of nations.28  Soon thereafter, Oliver Ellsworth, a member of 
the Continental Congress, drafted the Judiciary Act, which 
incorporated these recommendations.29  The Act included a 
provision, called the Alien Tort Clause, which granted federal 
jurisdiction over torts in violation of the law of nations.30  Simply 
put, the Alien Tort Clause was designed to provide aliens with 
the opportunity to bring suit in federal court, rather than state 
court.31  It was a likely motive of First Congress to provide a 
 
21 Id. 
22 Dodge, supra note 20, at 229–30. 
23 STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10147, THE RISE AND 
DECLINE OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 1 (2018). 
24 Id. 
25 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 67. 
26 MULLIGAN, supra note 23, at 1. 
27 See id., regarding the States’ refusal to comply with the 1783 Treaty of 
Peace with Great Britain, which required the elimination of any legal burdens 
that prevented British citizens from collecting pre-Revolutionary War debts. 
28 Dodge, supra note 20, at 231. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 See id. 
5
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federal forum to aliens due to the apprehension of possible 
hostility by State courts toward aliens and their claims, and it 
further allowed for a uniform interpretation of the law of 
nations.32 
 
The Alien Tort Clause was first revised when the clause 
transitioned to Section 563 of the Revised Statutes of 1873.33  It 
was again revised when the clause became Section 24 of the 
Judiciary Act of March 3, 1911.34  It was revised for a final time 
in 1948 as Section 1350 of Title 28 of the United States Code and 
was renamed the Alien Tort Statute.35  Mostly, these revisions 
simply clarified and tightened the statute’s language, without 
any substantive changes. 
 
The ATS was not invoked for nearly two hundred years.  
Thus, with no legislative history or precedent, the statute has 
been identified to have various theories derived by the many 
legal scholars who have attempted to understand and interpret 
the statute over time.  The modern theory of the ATS is that 
courts should interpret international law as it presently exists 
among the nations of the world, not as was in 1789.36  
Alternatively, the originalists theory is that modern human 
rights should be excluded from the scope of the ATS and that the 
statute should be limited to torts ordinarily in violation of the 
law of nations at the time the statute was written, such as piracy 
and torts against ambassadors.37  A similar theory considers 
eighteenth-century “prize law,” a prevalent area of law during 
the enactment of the ATS, to be the extent of the statute’s 
scope.38  This theory interpreted the ATS as being designed 
 
32 See Dodge, supra note 20, at 235–36, which highlights the writings of 
John Jay and Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 
43 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 476 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
33 Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of 
Nations, 18 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 445, 449 (1995). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. The Alien Tort Statute presently states: “The district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for tort only, committed 
in violation of the law of the nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1350. 
36 See Dodge, supra note 20, at 221–22. 
37 Id. at 222–24. 
38 Id. at 223. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss2/4
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exclusively over a subcategory of prize law cases, such as suits 
for torts committed during the capture of vessels, with the 
exclusion of issues involving the vessel’s status as a “prize.”39  In 
short, suits for a tort only.40  There is also the theory that the 
statute simply provides a federal forum to foreigners and for 
foreign affairs.41  Similarly, a final theory provides that the 
statute was designed to preclude the denial of justice to aliens in 
order to avoid any possible causes of war.42 
 
A cause of action brought under the ATS did not enter U.S. 
courtrooms until 1980.  The subsequent portion of this case note 
will describe how U.S. courts have interpreted cognizable causes 
of action under the ATS, as well as the ATS’s scope concerning 
corporate liability and extraterritorial application. 
A. Claims That are Actionable Under the ATS 
1. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala (2d Cir. 1980) 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala was the first case wherein a court 
analyzed and permitted international citizens to bring suit 
under the Alien Tort Statute.43  Dr. Joel and Dolly Filartiga 
brought suit against a Paraguayan law enforcement official, 
Americo Pena-Irala, for the wrongful death of their seventeen-
year-old son by use of torturous conduct.44  After being unable to 
justly pursue this matter in Paraguay because of the defendant’s 
power position, plaintiffs brought suit in federal district court 
while both parties temporarily resided in the United States on 
visas.45  Initially, the matter was dismissed for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.46  However, on appeal, the Second Circuit 
reversed, holding that deliberate torture committed by an 
official authority violated the unanimously accepted norms of 
human rights under international law and, regardless of a 
party’s nationality, they should be provided a means to seek 
 
39 Dodge, supra note 20, at 223. 
40 Id.  
41 Id. at 222–24. 
42 See id. at 235.  
43 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
44 Id. at 878. 
45 Id. at 878–79. 
46 Id. at 878. 
7
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justice.47  The court further concluded that the ATS provides 
alien parties with federal jurisdiction whenever an alleged 
torturer is found and process is served in the United States.48 
 
The Second Circuit highlighted the universal interest in 
protecting fundamental human rights and interpreted the ATS 
as a federal platform for the adjudication of rights already 
acknowledged by international law.49  The Filartiga decision was 
“a small but important step in the fulfillment of the ageless 
dream to free all people from brutal violence.”50  Ultimately, the 
Filartiga decision clarified that the ATS provided for jurisdiction 
over (1) tort actions; (2) specifically brought by aliens; and (3) for 
violations of the law of nations only.51 
2. Sosa v. Alvarez Machain (S. Ct. 2004) 
Twenty-four years after the Filartiga decision, the Supreme 
Court set forth requirements for bringing an action under the 
ATS in the decision of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.52  Plaintiff, 
Alvarez-Machain, claimed he was wrongfully captured and 
arbitrarily detained in Mexico by the defendant, Sosa, a bounty 
hunter operating as a United States agent.53  Sosa, who was 
acting under the direction of the Drug Enforcement Agency, 
captured Alvarez in Mexico and brought him to the United 
States to be tried for the murder of a DEA agent.54  After Alvarez 
was acquitted, he subsequently sued the United States for false 
arrest under the Federal Tort Claims Act and sued Sosa 
separately under the ATS.55  In his suit against Sosa, Alvarez 
alleged violations of the United Nations Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (Declaration), the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (Covenant), and customary 
 
47 Id. at 880. 
48 Id. at 878. 
49 Id. at 884–85, 887, 890. 
50 Id. at 890. 
51 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (Kiobel I), 621 F.3d 111, 116 (2d 
Cir. 2010) (discussing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890). 
52 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
53 Id. at 698. 
54 Id. 
55 Id.  
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss2/4
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international law for arbitrarily detaining him.56 
 
The Supreme Court explained the ATS by expressly holding 
that any ATS claim must be based on a universally recognized, 
specifically defined rule of international law that is capable of 
imposing obligations on international parties.57  In applying this 
holding to Alvarez’s suit, the Court determined that his 
arguments were based on definitions provided under the 
Declaration and the Covenant, which were neither binding nor 
imposed enforceable obligations on the federal court as a matter 
of international law; the Declaration and the Covenant were 
concluded as simply a set of principles.58  Moreover, the Court 
reasoned that arbitrary arrest was not a prohibited customary 
law and it did not rise to the level of a specifically defined, 
binding international norm actionable under the ATS.59 
 
The Sosa court established that not all international norms 
are automatically actionable under the ATS because the ATS is 
limited to a “narrow set of common law actions” derived from 
international law.60  The Supreme Court further developed a 
two-part analysis for determining the scope of this “narrow set” 
of actions.61  The two-step test requires the norm to be: (1) 
internationally accepted; and (2) defined with specificity.62  
Additionally, the Court firmly added that courts have no 
Congressional obligation to pursue and define new, and likely 
debatable, law of nations violations.63  Simply put, the Supreme 
Court held that the ATS was not designed to open federal courts 
for just any international law violation and it further cautioned 
 
56 Id. at 734–35; see also G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights art. 9 (Dec. 10, 1948) (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
arrest, detention or exile.”); International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights art. 9, ¶¶ 1, 5, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention[; n]o one shall be deprived of his 
liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are 
established by law[; . . . and a]nyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest 
or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.”). 
57 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725–26. 
58 Id. at 734–35. 
59 Id. at 734–38. 
60 Id. at 721. 
61 Id. at 725–26. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 728, 732. 
9
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that it was not a statute for broad and evolving interpretation.64 
3. Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank (2d Cir. 2007) 
Three years after Sosa, Khulumani v. Barclay National 
Bank was decided.  This lawsuit incorporated several plaintiffs, 
approximately fifty corporate defendants, and hundreds of 
“corporate Does.”65  Plaintiffs contended that defendants 
knowingly and actively collaborated with the South African 
government to uphold an apartheid system, which favored and 
benefited the minority white population over the majority black 
African population in all areas of life.66  Plaintiffs brought suit 
in federal district court under the ATS claiming that the 
defendant corporations aided and abetted various international 
law violations such as: apartheid; torture; extrajudicial killing; 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; denationalization; 
unfair and discriminatory forced labor practice; and many 
more.67  Defendants were both domestic and foreign 
corporations.68  The district court recognized the probable 
international conflict that would arise with South Africa from 
these proceedings and, as a result, dismissed the complaint in 
its entirety.69  One ground in support of dismissal was the failure 
to establish subject matter jurisdiction because the scope of ATS 
did not include aiding and abetting liability.70 
 
On appeal, the Court considered the aiding and abetting 
claim, as well as a significant preliminary question of whether 
the proper legal standard should be derived from domestic law 
or international law.71  The Khulumani court recognized that 
international law was well-familiarized with the realm of aiding 
and abetting liability, as it is an area of law commonly addressed 
by many international tribunals.72  The Khulumani court 
 
64 Id.  




69 Id. at 259. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 260–61.  
72 Id. at 270 (Katzmann, J., concurring). Aiding and abetting liability has 
been authorized and applied as far back as the war crime trials following World 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss2/4
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determined that domestic and international law should not be 
intertwined when international law provides a suitable 
definition or means of remedy to maintain uniformity amongst 
international disputes.73  Thus, Khulumani established that, so 
long as aiding and abetting claims meet the two requirements of 
Sosa, they can be brought under the ATS and are to be 
considered under the international law standard of aiding and 
abetting.74 
B. Corporate Liability Under the ATS 
1. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (2d Cir. 2010) 
In 2010, the Second Circuit decided Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum (Kiobel I), wherein Nigerian citizens who resided in 
the United States brought suit in federal court under the ATS, 
claiming that certain Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations 
aided and abetted the Nigerian Government in committing 
violations of human rights through oil exploration and 
production.75  The district court dismissed a majority of the 
plaintiffs’ claims and an interlocutory appeal occurred.76  In 
2010, there was still a great deal of unmarked territory 
regarding ATS jurisprudence.77  Of the many unanswered 
questions, Kiobel I presented the Second Circuit with one: 
whether corporations could be sued under the ATS.78  To answer 
this question, the court looked for guidance in various 
international tribunals, searching for other nation’s conclusions 
on the issue, which was found to be nonexistent.79  As a result, 
the court dismissed the complaint for plaintiffs' failure to 
properly allege a claim under the ATS, holding that corporations 
 
War II and has been accepted on a recurring basis ever since. Id. Such liability 
is “recognized in numerous international treaties, most notably the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, and in the statutes creating the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”).” Id.  
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 261–62. 
75 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (Kiobel I), 621 F.3d 111, 117 (2d 
Cir. 2010). 
76 Id. at 124. 
77 Id. at 117. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 118. 
11
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could not be sued under the ATS.80 
2. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC (9th Cir. 2011) 
Approximately one year after Kiobel I, the Ninth Circuit 
addressed the issue of corporate liability under the ATS in Sarei 
v. Rio Tinto, PLC.81  Rio Tinto, an international mining company 
headquartered in London, opened a mine in Papua New Guinea 
(PNG) with the assistance of the PNG government.82  Certain 
mining activities resulted in significant pollution of PNG 
waterways and atmosphere, which threatened the health of 
PNG’s residents.83  Residents attempted to close the mine but 
Rio Tinto with the support of the PNG government, remained 
open.84  This dispute led to a ten-year civil war, resulting in 
thousands of deaths of PNG residents and serious health issues 
to those who survived.85  In response, numerous PNG residents 
brought suit in federal district court under the ATS against the 
mining company for claims of: war crimes; racial discrimination; 
violation of the rights to health, life, and security of the person; 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatments; international 
environmental violations; and a consistent pattern of gross 
human rights violations.86  This matter went before the Ninth 
Circuit’s en banc panel twice.87  The plaintiffs’ second appeal, 
under the direction of the court, regarded only claims for 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and racial 
discrimination.88 
 
Kiobel I was not binding on the Ninth Circuit, so the court 
took it upon themselves to address the issue, determining that 
two inquiries needed to be made: (1) whether the ATS barred all 
corporate liability, and if it did not, was such liability limited to 
individuals; and (2) if the ATS did not bar corporate liability, 
 
80 Id. at 120. 
81 Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1121–27 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
82 Id. 
83 Id.  
84 Id.  
85 Id.  
86 Id. at 1120. 
87 Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); Sarei v. 
Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
88 Sarei, 671 F.3d at 743. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss2/4
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whether the international norm in question recognized 
corporate liability.89  Concerning the first inquiry, the en banc 
panel adopted the view expressed by Judge Leval in his 
concurring decision of Kiobel I, which stated that no opinion of 
domestic or international law supported the conclusion that 
claims actionable under the ATS only applied to natural persons 
and not corporations, “leaving corporations [completely] immune 
from suit and free to retain profits earned through such acts.”90  
The panel further supported this view because the ATS 
maintained no language nor legislative history to suggest a bar 
of corporate liability or an intention of liability solely of natural 
persons.91  Thus, the panel concluded there was no basis to hold 
that such a limitation existed.92 
 
The second inquiry required the court to analyze the specific 
international norms included in plaintiffs’ claims—genocide and 
war crimes.93  Relying on Sosa, the Ninth Circuit noted that each 
norm allegedly violated in an ATS claim must be specific, 
universal, and obligatory to be actionable under the ATS.94  The 
panel then concluded that both genocide and war crimes met the 
Sosa standard. 95  Furthermore, because international law 
recognized both corporate liability and aiding and abetting 
liability for both the norms of genocide and war crimes, plaintiffs 
adequately alleged those claims.96  Appropriately, the panel 
remanded those issues for further proceedings.97 
 
Contrary to the Second Circuit’s holding in Kiobel I, the 
Ninth Circuit stated that the absence of precedent regarding 
corporate liability under the ATS did not automatically imply 
that it was a legal impossibility.98  Ultimately, the en banc panel 
 
89 Id. at 747. 
90 Sarei, 550 F.3d at 747 (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 
(Kiobel I), 621 F.3d 111, 153 (2d Cir. 2010)). 
91 Id. at 747–48. 
92 Id. at 748. 
93 Id. at 744. 
94 Id. at 743. 
95 See id. at 758–67, for the court’s full discussion on genocide and war 
crimes. 
96 Id.  
97 Id. at 770. 
98 Id. at 761. 
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established three principles regarding corporate liability under 
the ATS: 
First, the analysis proceeds norm-by-norm; there is no categorical 
rule of corporate immunity or liability. Second, corporate liability 
under an ATS claim does not depend on the existence of 
international precedent enforcing legal norms against 
corporations. Third, norms that are “universal and absolute,” or 
applicable to “all actors,” can provide the basis for an ATS claim 
against a corporation. To determine whether a norm is universal, 
[it is] consider[ed], among other things, whether it is “limited to 
states” and whether its application depends on the identity of the 
perpetrator.99 
3. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC (S. Ct. 2018) 
Seven years after Sarei, the Supreme Court addressed 
corporate liability under the ATS in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC; 
specifically, foreign corporations.100  In Jesner, petitioners 
brought suit under the ATS against defendant, Arab Bank, who 
purportedly permitted certain bank officials to utilize and 
transfer funds to terrorist groups in the Middle East, resulting 
in acts of terrorism that led to certain deaths and injuries.101  
Initially, the district court granted judgment on the pleadings in 
favor of Arab Bank and plaintiffs subsequently appealed.102  At 
that time, both the district court and the Second Circuit were 
bound by their previous decision of Koibel I, which barred 
corporate liability under the ATS.103  As a result, the Second 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.104  Certiorari was 
then granted to determine whether the Judiciary had the 
authority to determine and enforce foreign corporate liability 
under the ATS without the authorization from Congress.105 
 
The Supreme Court upholds a strong position of respect 
 
99 Doe I v. Nestle U.S.A., Inc. (Nestle II), 766 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 
2014) (citing Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 747–48, 760–61, 764–65 
(9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)). 
100 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1389–90 (2018). 
101 Id. at 1393.   
102 Id. at 1386. 
103 Id. at 1395. 
104 Id.  
105 Id. at 1394. 
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toward Congress and the Court’s precedents do not support the 
authority of the Judiciary to extend or create causes of action in 
domestic law.106  Furthermore, Congress preserves the 
responsibility and capacity to weigh in on foreign policy 
concerns.107  The Jesner case caused over a decade of political 
tensions with Jordan—a critical ally of the United States—
because Jordan found the litigation to be disrespectful to its 
sovereignty.108  Additionally, Jordan was “a key 
counterterrorism partner,” particularly during the universal 
movement against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.109  The 
Court stressed that this was the exact foreign apprehension that 
First Congress sought to avert when enacting the ATS.110  
Therefore, because ATS litigation with foreign corporations has 
such a critical effect on both foreign relations and the separation 
of powers, the Court found it “inappropriate for courts to extend 
ATS liability to foreign corporations.”111 
C. Extraterritorial Application of the ATS 
1. Morrison v. National Australian Bank, Ltd. (S. Ct. 
2010) 
Our courts are often presented with the issue of whether a 
federal law applies extraterritorially.  In 2010, the Supreme 
Court developed a solution to this problem by outlining a two-
part analysis called the “focus test.”112  In Morrison v. National 
Australian Bank Ltd., foreign investors brought a class action 
against Australian National Bank for securities fraud involving 
foreign transactions under Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.113  The issue was whether the Securities 
Exchange Act provided a cause of action for misconduct related 
to securities traded extraterritorially on foreign exchanges.114  
The Supreme Court developed the “focus test” as a means of 
 
106 Id. at 1402. 
107 Id. at 1402–03. 
108 Id. at 1406. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 1390. 
111 Id. at 1403 (emphasis added). 
112 See generally Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
113 Id. at 250–53. 
114 Id. at 250–51. 
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statutory interpretation to determine whether statutes without 
extraterritorial application can be applied to conduct that occurs 
both domestically and abroad.115  Both parts of the “focus test” 
require an inquiry into congressional concern—first, a court 
must determine whether the statute was meant to apply 
extraterritorially and, second, a court must determine the focus 
of congressional concern in passing the statute.116  In Morrison, 
the Court explained that the focus of the Securities Exchange 
Act was the purchase and sale of securities and applied only to 
domestic exchanges and transactions.117  Thus, the Act was not 
meant to apply extraterritorially and plaintiffs did not have an 
actionable claim.118  Ultimately, Morrison established the 
“presumption against extraterritoriality,” which provides that a 
statute cannot be applied extraterritorially if there is no clear 
indication of such application.119 
2. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum (Kiobel II) (S. Ct. 
2013) 
Following the Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel I, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of 
extraterritoriality.  Specifically, whether our courts can address 
ATS claims for law of nations violations occurring outside of the 
United States.120  In Kiobel II, the defendant corporations 
asserted the presumption against extraterritoriality standard 
established in Morrison.121  The Court highlighted that the 
importance of the presumption against extraterritoriality was to 
guarantee that the Judiciary did not inaccurately adopt a 
certain interpretation of domestic law that carried “foreign 
policy consequences not clearly intended by the [legislative] 
branch.”122 
 
By 2013, the Supreme Court had consistently cautioned 
 
115 Id. at 264–65. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 266–67. 
118 Id. at 266–68. 
119 Id. at 255.  
120 See generally Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (Kiobel II), 569 U.S. 
108 (2013). 
121 Id. at 115. 
122 Id. at 116. 
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other courts to consider foreign policy concerns when 
determining what claims could be brought under the ATS.123  
This caution was based on the principle that United States law 
does not rule the world.124  Ultimately, the Court affirmed that 
the language of the ATS did not indicate extraterritorial 
application.125  The Court pointed out that nothing immediately 
before nor after the passage of the ATS provided support for the 
notion that Congress enacted the ATS with the expectation of 
actions arising from conduct occurring abroad.126  Furthermore, 
there is no indication that the ATS was enacted to have the 
United States regulate the world on international norms.127 
 
In Kiobel II, plaintiffs’ allegations concerned conduct that 
occurred outside of the United States.128  It was acknowledged 
that some of the alleged conduct “touched and concerned” 
territory of the United States; however, such conduct “must do 
so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against 
extraterritorial application.”129  “[M]ere corporate presence” was 
not enough to satisfy that burden.130  Thus, Kiobel II established 
that: (1) the ATS does not overcome the presumption against 
extraterritorial application; and (2) that all relevant conduct 
alleged in an ATS claim against a foreign corporation must take 
place in the United States to be actionable.131 
 
III. SCOPE OF AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY FOR 
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Aiding and abetting liability for violations of international 
law is a well-known area of law in the Nuremberg Tribunals, the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR), the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, the Special Court for Sierra 
 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 115. 
125 Id. at 118. 
126 Id. at 120–21. 
127 Id. at 123. 
128 Id. at 124–25. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 125. 
131 Id. at 124–25. 
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Leone, and the United States.132 
A. Actus Reus 
The ICTY has constructed the most appropriate governing 
rule of the actus reus component of aiding and abetting 
violations of international law.133  This rule states that:  
 
[A]n aider and abettor carries out acts specifically directed to 
assist, encourage, or lend moral support to the perpetration of a 
certain specific crime, which have a substantial effect on the 
perpetration of the crime. The actus reus need not serve as 
condition precedent for the crime and may occur before, during, or 
after the principal crime has been perpetrated.134 
 
In 2013, the ICTY clarified this rule, explaining that the 
“specifically directed” requirement of aiding and abetting is 
directed to “the ‘link’ between the assistance provided and the 
principal offense, and requires that ‘assistance must be 
“specifically”—rather than “in some way”—directed towards the 
relevant crimes.’”135  United States’ courts have since adopted 
and implemented this rule.136  Specifically, the district court for 
the Southern District of New York indicated that an aider and 
abettor’s assistance “must bear a causative relationship to the 
specific wrongful conduct committed by the principal.”137  While 
aider and abettor assistance need not be the “but-for” cause,  it 
must have an actual effect on the principal actor’s commission 
 
132 Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 270–71 (2d Cir. 
2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring). 
133 Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Judgment, ¶ 127 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 9, 2007), 
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/blagojevic_jokic/acjug/en/blajok-jud070509.pdf. 
134 Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
135 Doe I v. Nestle U.S.A., Inc. (Nestle II), 766 F.3d 1013, 1026 (9th Cir. 
2014) (quoting Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 27, 37 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013), 
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/acjug/en/130228_judgement.pdf).  
136 See id.; Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 
F.3d 244, 259 (2d. Cir. 2009); Doe v. Nestle, S.A. (Nestle I), 748 F. Supp. 2d 
1057, 1080 (C.D. Cal. 2010); S. Afr. Apartheid Litig. v. Daimler, A.G., 617 F. 
Supp. 2d 228, 257–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
137 Nestle I, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1081. 
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of a specific crime.138  Generalized assistance cannot sufficiently 
sustain a claim of aiding and abetting; instead, two elements 
must be met: (1) the assistance must be specifically directed or 
bear a direct causative relationship to a specific wrongful act; 
and (2) the assistance must have a substantial effect on that 
wrongful act.139  To determine if these elements are met, a 
context-specific, “fact-based inquiry” is required.140 
 
When a plaintiff alleges aiding and abetting conduct in the 
form of tacit approval and encouragement, such as plaintiffs in 
Doe v. Nestle, S.A., the identification of the actus reus component 
is not so clear-cut.141  Tacit approval and encouragement is a 
theory of liability dating as far back as the era of the Nuremberg 
Trials.142  Under modern case law, tacit approval and 
encouragement liability requires “the combination of a position 
of authority and physical presence at the crime scene[, which] 
allow[s] the inference that non-interference by the accused 
actually amounted to tacit approval and encouragement.”143  
Additionally, it must still be shown that such approval and 
encouragement was substantial, which, under the 
circumstances of this specific allegation, “requires . . . the 
‘principal perpetrators [to be] aware of [the encouragement]’ 
because otherwise, the [approval] and encouragement would not 




139 Id. at 1081–82. 
140 Id. at 1081.  
141 Id. at 1081–82. 
142 Id. See, for example, United States v. Ohlendor (The Einsatzgruppen 
Case), in 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NURENBERG MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 570–72 (William S. Hein & 
Co., Inc. 1997), which discusses the lack of the defendant’s specific 
participation in the crimes at issue, but highlights his general involvement and 
high-ranking position in the organization which did commit such crimes, 
heavily contradicting the defendant’s argument of unawareness of the crime.  
143 Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-A, Judgment, ¶ 42 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 3, 2008), 
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/oric/acjug/en/080703.pdf. 
144 Nestle I, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1082 (quoting Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case 
No. IT-99-36-A, Judgment, ¶ 277 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Apr. 3, 2007), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/acjug/en/brd-aj070403-
e.pdf). 
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B. Mens Rea 
There has been an ongoing worldwide debate as to whether 
the appropriate mens rea for aiding and abetting violations of 
international law is knowledge or purpose.145  The knowledge 
standard dates back to the Nuremberg Tribunals in 1946.146  
Additionally, in 1998, the ICTY concluded that the proper 
standard is knowledge.147  Even more recently, in 2013, the 
Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone affirmed 
the knowledge standard.148  The proper articulation of this 
standard would be: “[t]he requisite mental element of aiding and 
abetting is knowledge that the acts performed assist the 
commission of the specific crime of the principal perpetrator.”149  
More specifically, the aider and abettor must know or have 
reason to know that her acts or omissions assisted in the 
furtherance of the principal actor’s commission of the crime.150 
 
145 Compare Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Judgment, ¶ 
127 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 9, 2007), 
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/blagojevic_jokic/acjug/en/blajok-jud070509.pdf 
(applying knowledge standard), and Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-
95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 205 (May 21, 1999), 
https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-95-1/trial-
judgements/en/990521.pdf (applying knowledge standard), with Aziz v. 
Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 401 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying purpose standard). 
146 See Zyklon B Case, in 1 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 93–
102 (1947), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Law-Reports_Vol-
1.pdf [hereinafter Zyklon B Case], which assesses the defendant’s guilt based 
on his provision of poisonous gas to Nazis knowing of its ultimate unlawful 
purpose.  
147 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 249 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998), 
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/furundzija/tjug/en/fur-tj981210e.pdf, aff’d, Case 
No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 117 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
July 21, 2000), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/furundzija/acjug/en/fur-
aj000721e.pdf. 




149 Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Judgment, ¶ 127 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 9, 2007), 
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/blagojevic_jokic/acjug/en/blajok-jud070509.pdf; 
see Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR-99-46-A, Judgment, ¶ 370 (July 7, 
2006), https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-99-
46/trial-judgements/en/060707.pdf; Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-
A, Judgment, ¶ 45 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004), 
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/acjug/en/bla-aj040729e.pdf. 
150 Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-A, Judgment, ¶ 43 (Int’l Crim. 
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The conclusion of knowledge as the mens rea standard for 
aiding and abetting violations of international law poses a 
problem for claims brought under the ATS.  This is because the 
knowledge standard is less-stringent and fails the Supreme 
Court’s Sosa requirements of universality and definiteness.151  
The International Court of Justice has refrained from making a 
determination as to whether the proper standard of aiding and 
abetting violations of international law is knowledge or purpose 
when considering crimes of genocide; however, Nuremberg-era 
precedents support the purpose standard.152  Moreover, the 
Second and Fourth Federal U.S. Circuits have adopted the 
purpose standard in reliance on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, which is further in support of the 
purpose standard.153 
IV. DOE V. NESTLE, S.A. 
A. The Pleadings Stage 
On July 14, 2005, the International Labor Rights Forum 
(ILRF) filed suit in the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California against several multi-billion dollar 
international companies, such as: Nestle, S.A.; Nestle, U.S.A.; 
Nestle, Ivory Coast; Archer Daniels Midland Co.; Cargill, Inc.; 
Cargill Cocoa; Cargill West Africa, S.A.; and ten other 
“Corporate Does.”154  This class action was filed on behalf of 
plaintiffs: John Doe I, John Doe II, John Doe III, and Global 
 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 3, 2008), 
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/oric/acjug/en/080703.pdf. 
151 Id. 
152 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶¶ 
421–24 (Feb. 26), https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/91/091-20070226-
JUD-01-00-EN.pdf, where the court declined to decide whether the crime of 
aiding and abetting genocide required the sharing of or simply knowing of the 
principal’s criminal intent. 
153 Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 399–401 (4th Cir. 2011); 
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d 
Cir. 2009); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25, ¶ 3(c), 
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3. 
154 Doe v. Nestle, S.A. (Nestle I), 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1063 (C.D. Cal. 
2010). 
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Exchange.155  Does I–III are Malian children who were forced to 
labor on the Ivory Coast cocoa fields, and their class status 
extended to all similarly situated Malian children.156  The ILRF 
chose to sue in the United States not only because it was 
probable that this lawsuit would elicit a potentially harmful 
response in Africa but, because of the infamously corrupt judicial 
system in Cote D’Ivoire, it was assumed that any claims brought 
against corporations which brought significant revenue into the 
country would likely be ignored.157  Further, no law existed in 
Mali allowing civil damages for injuries caused by non-Malian 
parties.158 
 
Plaintiffs’ complaint asserted allegations regarding the 
aiding and abetting of slavery, forced labor, child labor, torture, 
and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment in the continuance 
of exclusive supplier/buyer relationships with farmers in Cote 
d’Ivoire who utilized child slave labor.159  Plaintiffs proclaimed 
that the exclusive contractual agreements defendants had with 
the Ivorian farmers allowed them to dictate the terms of 
production and supply, which included labor conditions.160  
Specifically, that defendants maintained strong control over the 
Ivorian farmers through their provision of ongoing financial 
support, including advanced payments and personal spending 
money to keep their loyalty as exclusive suppliers; farming 
supplies, including fertilizer, tools, and other equipment; 
training in particular growing and fermentation techniques and 
general farm maintenance, including appropriate labor practices 
to increase the quality and quantity of cocoa beans.161  
Furthermore, defendants’ oversight of the farms required 
training and quality control visits numerous times per year.162  
 
155 Id. Global Exchange is a San Francisco-based human rights 
organization that promotes international social justice. See Our Vision & 
Mission, GLOB. EXCH., https://globalexchange.org/about-us/mission/ (last 
visited May 12, 2021). Global Exchange brought only one cause of action, so 
“plaintiffs” refers solely to the “Does.” Nestle I, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1063 n.1. 
156 Nestle I, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1063–64.  





162 Id. at 1064–65.  
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As such, plaintiffs asserted that defendants maintained first-
hand knowledge of the child slave labor occurring on such farms 
because of their ongoing presence there.163 
 
In December of 2005, three of the defendant corporations––
Archer Daniels Midland Company, Nestle, U.S.A., and Cargill, 
Inc.––moved to dismiss ILRF’s complaint.164  Defendants 
challenged plaintiffs’ allegations regarding their alleged 
knowledge of the purported child slave labor and argued that the 
farmers were the perpetrators of the criminal acts of which they 
were not involved.165  The defendant corporations argued that, 
according to Sosa, corporate liability did not come within the 
scope of claims actionable under the ATS, nor did the 
international norm of child labor come within the narrow class 
of international law norms cognizable under the ATS.166  
Defendants further proclaimed that to impose the unreasonable 
obligation of corporations to oversee and prevent any wrongful 
act committed in the production of goods would be not only 
outrageous and overly burdensome to corporations but seriously 
detrimental to the global economy.167 
 
The district court held that plaintiffs’ complaint failed to 
allege specific conduct amounting to the assistance or 
encouragement of child slave labor by the defendants nor were 
there sufficient allegations of any conduct that had a substantial 
effect in the commission of the supposed crime.168  The court 
further determined that the complaint failed to assert that 
defendants maintained the required mens rea in assisting the 
Ivorian farm owners’ wrongful acts.169  Accordingly, plaintiffs 
 
163 Id. at 1066. 
164 See generally Notice of Mot. And Mot. of Defs. Archer-Daniels-Midland 
Co.; Nestle, U.S.A.; and Cargill, Inc. to Dismiss Pls.’ Compl. Pursuant to Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for Failure to State a Claim for Which Relief Can Be 
Granted, Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (No. CV-
05-5133-SVW), 2005 WL 4134362 [hereinafter Defs. Mot. to Dismiss 2010]. 
165 Defs. Mot. to Dismiss 2010, supra note 164, at 6. 
166 Id. at 7. 
167 Id. at 2.  
168 Nestle I, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1098 (relying on Prosecutor v. Blagojević, 
Case No. IT-02-60-A, Judgment, ¶ 127 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
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were given the opportunity to amend their complaint to add the 
necessary factual support to their aiding and abetting claims, 
which they did in July of 2009.170  Shortly thereafter, defendants 
moved to dismiss the amended complaint and asserted that 
plaintiffs still had not alleged conduct sufficient to hold them 
liable for aiding and abetting under the ATS.171  The matter then 
proceeded for oral argument. 
B. Nestle I (C.D. Cal. 2010) 
Following oral argument, on September 8, 2010, the United 
States District Court for the Central District of California issued 
the first of many decisions in this matter; five years after the 
initial complaint was filed.172  At that time, the district court was 
bound by Sosa, and, because all named defendants were 
corporations, the court dismissed the ATS claims.173  
1. The Aiding and Abetting Claim: Actus Reus 
Component 
Plaintiffs described three types of activities to support their 
aiding and abetting allegations: (1) financial assistance; (2) 
provision of farming supplies, technical assistance, and training; 
and (3) failure to exercise economical leverage.174  Alternatively, 
defendants interpreted those allegations as five separate 
categories: (1) financial assistance; (2) providing farming 
supplies and technical farming assistance; (3) providing training 
in labor practices; (4) failing to exercise economic leverage; and 
(5) lobbying the United States government to avoid a mandatory 
labeling scheme.175  Because the burden to plead sufficient facts 
to the court was on the plaintiffs, the court adopted their 
interpretation and addressed each activity separately.176 
 
170 Id. at 1063; Pls. First Am. Class Action Compl. for Inj. Relief and 
Damages, Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (No. CV-
05-5133-SVW), 2009 WL 2921081 [hereinafter Pls.’ First Am. Compl.]. 
171 Nestle I, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1063; Defs. Mot. to Dismiss 2010, supra 
note 164, at 12. 
172 Nestle I, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1057. 
173 Id. at 1125, 1130, 1144–45. 
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a. Financial Assistance 
Plaintiffs maintained the position that defendants provided 
the Ivorian farmers with monetary incentives, including 
advanced payments and personal spending money, to build 
loyalty, to retain an exclusive buyer/supplier relationship, and 
to keep the cost of cocoa beans cheap.177  Plaintiffs submitted 
that this ongoing financial support provided the farmers with 
enticements to employ slave labor.178  The court determined that 
the defendants’ ongoing financial support was merely part of a 
commercial transaction, which, without more, could not satisfy 
the actus reus requirement of aiding and abetting under 
international law.179  The court reasoned that plaintiffs did not 
explicitly assert that defendants provided large sums of money 
to the Ivorian farmers in furtherance of or in encouragement of 
child labor, forced labor, or the like.180  The four corners of 
plaintiffs’ complaint only supported that the defendants’ 
payments to the Ivorian farmers were simply in exchange for 
cocoa beans, to secure future cocoa supplies, and to maintain the 
farmers’ loyalty as exclusive suppliers.181  Thus, the allegation 
concerning financial assistance was unsuccessful.182 
b. Providing Farming Supplies, Technical 
Assistance, and Training 
With regard to the provision of farming supplies, technical 
assistance, and training, plaintiffs submitted that the defendant 
corporations conducted training and quality control visits 
several times per year, provided technical assistance in crop 
production, and provided technical assistance regarding new 
strategies to deal with crop infestation and income generation.183  
Specifically, the corporations provided the farmers with the 
knowledge, tools, and support they needed to maintain 
 
177 Id.   
178 Id. at 1099 (quoting Pls.’ Suppl. Mem. of Points and Authorities in 
Resp. to Ct.’s Order Dated June 11, 2009 and in Further Opp’n to Mot. to 
Dismiss at 14–15, Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2010) 
(No. CV-05-5133-SVW), 2009 WL 2921078 [hereinafter Pls.’ Suppl. Mem.]).  
179 Id. at 1099–100. 
180 Id. at 1100. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. (quoting Pls.’ First Am. Compl., supra note 170, ¶¶ 34, 36–38). 
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successful farms.184  This included providing research and 
schooling regarding the latest and best cocoa farming 
techniques.185  Plaintiffs asserted that this support 
demonstrated that defendants “provid[ed] . . . the necessary 
means . . . to carry out slave labor” because their actions 
provided “logistical support and supplies essential to continuing 
the forced labor and torture.”186 
 
 Unfortunately, the district court found plaintiffs’ 
arguments fruitless.187  Similar to the court’s reasoning 
concerning financial assistance, plaintiffs’ allegations needed to 
be specifically directed to the assistance or encouragement of the 
commission of a particular crime, or they needed to assert 
conduct that had a “substantial effect” on the specific crimes of 
forced labor, child labor, torture, and cruel, inhumane, and 
degrading treatment.188  The court explained that sufficient 
allegations would have been the defendants’ provision of guns 
and whips that were used to threaten, intimidate, or force the 
child slave labor, or providing the farmers with training on how 
to utilize guns and whips, or how to deprive children of food and 
water and other means of psychological abuse and torture.189  
Those types of specific allegations are required to adequately 
give rise to the aiding and abetting of international law 
violations.190  Plaintiffs’ complaint merely asserted that the 
defendant corporations assisted the Ivorian farmers in the act of 
growing crops and managing their business.191  The complaint 
was ultimately silent of any substantial assistance in forced 
labor, child labor, torture, or cruel, inhumane, and degrading 
treatment.192 
c. Failure to Exercise Economic Leverage 
Lastly, plaintiffs contended that, because defendant 
 
184 Id. (quoting Pls.’ First Am. Compl., supra note 170, ¶¶ 40–41). 
185 Id. (quoting Pls.’ First Am. Compl., supra note 170, ¶¶ 40–41). 
186 Id. (quoting Pls.’ Suppl. Mem., supra note 178, at 17–18). 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 1100–01. 
189 Id. at 1101. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 1102. 
192 Id. 
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corporations obtained economic leverage over the Ivorian region 
and their exclusive supplier/buyer agreements with the farmers, 
they each maintained the ability to control and/or limit the use 
of forced child labor by the supplier farms from which they 
purchased their cocoa beans.193  The district court analyzed 
these allegations under the “omissions, moral support, and tacit 
approval and encouragement” theory, which fell outside the 
definitive scope of aiding and abetting liability under 
international law and was ultimately an undefined area of 
law.194  The court looked to legal authority from the ICTY and 
ICTR, and, although it found conclusions regarding omissions, 
moral support, and tacit approval and encouragement under 
aiding and abetting, the court felt that this area of law was “too 
unclear to satisfy Sosa’s requirements of definiteness and 
universality.”195  Nevertheless, the court did note four significant 
observations regarding this area of law: 
 
First, one must attempt to distinguish omissions, moral support, 
and tacit approval and encouragement from the concept of 
“command responsibility,” which “holds a superior responsible for 
the actions of subordinates. . . .”196 Second, an “omission” or 
“failure to act” only gives rise to aiding and abetting liability “if 
there is a legal duty to act. . . .”197  Third, it must be emphasized 
that aiding and abetting by way of “moral support” and “tacit 
approval and encouragement” is a rare breed (and, in fact, a non-
existent breed for purposes of the Alien Tort Statute).198  [Finally,] 
it is important to note that all of the “moral support” cases involve 
a defendant who held formal military, political, or administrative 
 
193 Id. (citing Pls.’ First Am. Compl., supra note 170, ¶ 48). 
194 Id.  
195 Id. at 1103; see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kayishema, No. ICTR-95-1-A, 
Judgment, ¶¶ 201–02 (June 1, 2001), 
https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-95-1/appeals-
chamber-judgements/en/010601.pdf (affirming the trial court’s finding of guilt 
via tacit encouragement based on defendant’s position of authority and failure 
to oppose the crime). 
196 Nestle I, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1104 (quoting Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 
103 F.3d 767, 777 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
197 Id. (quoting Prosecutor v. Mrksic, Case No. IT-95-13/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 
134 & n.481 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 5, 2009), 
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mrksic/acjug/en/090505.pdf). 
198 Id. at 1105. 
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authority.199 
 
In other words, the responsibility for international law 
violations could extend beyond the principal actor to anyone 
with higher authority who authorized, tolerated, or knowingly 
ignored those acts.200  However, for purposes of the ATS, liability 
was only recognized “in cases where the duty to act arises from 
an obligation imposed by criminal laws or the laws and customs 
of war.”201  Aside from establishing the four important points 
listed above, the court concluded that the actus reus of “moral 
support” and “tacit approval and encouragement” were not 
adequately well-defined and universally accepted, as required 
by Sosa, to be an actionable norm under international law.202 
 
Plaintiffs attempted to argue that defendants’ conduct 
should have been viewed as a whole because despite the conduct 
being unactionable individually, it rose to an actionable level 
when viewed in totality.203  The court overwhelmingly concluded 
that plaintiffs’ allegations only provided that the defendants 
were purchasing and assisting in the production of cocoa.204  All 
that plaintiffs demonstrated to the court was simple commercial 
transactions between the defendant corporations and the 
Ivorian farmers.205  Much more was required to show, both 
individually and as a whole, that defendants’ had “a material 
and direct effect” on the forced labor, child labor, torture, or 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment by the Ivorian 
farmers.206  As a result, the actus reus component was not met.207 
2. The Aiding and Abetting Claim: Mens Rea 
Component 
Despite plaintiffs’ failure to adequately allege the actus reus 
component of aiding and abetting liability, the court 
 
199 Id.; see, e.g., Kayishema, No. ICTR-95-1-A ¶¶ 201–02, 293–94. 
200 Hilao, 103 F.3d at 777.  
201 Nestle I, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1105. 
202 Id. at 1109. 
203 Id. at 1109–10. 
204 Id. at 1100. 
205 Id. 
206 Id.  
207 Id. 
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nevertheless continued to consider the mens rea component.  
Plaintiffs’ mens rea allegations asserted that the defendants’ 
long-term relationship with the farmers, which included 
occasional physical contact, reflected an awareness of the labor 
problems that were present.208  Furthermore, plaintiffs asserted 
that defendants made public representations of their concern 
regarding the child labor epidemic and took affirmative actions 
to reduce it on the farms they worked with.209  Plaintiffs’ 
ultimate contention was that, based on those efforts and actions, 
defendants knew or reasonably should have known that child-
labor abuse occurred on the Ivorian farms, arguing knowledge 
as the proper standard.210 
 
The court disagreed with plaintiffs’ position regarding the 
knowledge standard and stated that plaintiffs needed to show 
that defendants “intended and desired to substantially assist the 
Ivorian farmers” in acts contributing to the child slave labor, 
which their allegations did not.211  Even under the mens rea 
standard of knowledge, the court could not wholly conclude that 
defendants maintained first-hand knowledge that their actions 
specifically contributed to the child slave labor that occurred.212  
The court specified that plaintiffs’ allegations failed to raise a 
claim of reasonable inference that the defendants knew or 
should have known that their provision of money, training, tools, 
and tacit encouragement further assisted the criminal acts 
committed by the Ivorian farmers.213  Further, plaintiffs did not 
demonstrate that defendants either knew that their conduct 
would substantially assist, or that defendants intended for their 
conduct to substantially assist, torturous child slave labor.214  
Plaintiffs’ allegations, and their conceivable inferences, only 
indicated that defendants knew about the universal problem of 
 
208 Id. (citing Pls.’ First Am. Compl., supra note 170, ¶¶ 34, 38). 
209 Id. (citing Pls.’ First Am. Compl., supra note 170, ¶¶ 45–46, 51, 54–
55). 
210 Id. 
211 Id. at 1111. 
212 Id. (relying on Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-A, 
Judgment, ¶ 127 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 9, 2007), 
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/blagojevic_jokic/acjug/en/blajok-jud070509.pdf). 
213 Id. 
214 See id. 
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child labor on certain cocoa farms in Cote d’Ivoire.215  
Consequently, the absence of adequate allegations of 
defendants’ purpose or intent in assisting the specific crimes 
asserted against them, the mens rea component was similarly 
not satisfied.216  Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss the 
claims of aiding and abetting were granted for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted.217 
3. The Agency Theory Claim 
As an alternative theory, plaintiffs attempted to hold 
defendants liable under an agency theory, asserting that the 
defendants were principals of the Ivorian farmers.218  The court 
quickly terminated this argument.219  Most significantly, the 
court emphasized that plaintiffs’ contentions erroneously relied 
on domestic agency law because international law provided a 
more appropriate body of law.220  The court stressed that, per 
Sosa, domestic law is only to be utilized when international law 
is silent on the topic.221  Furthermore, even if domestic agency 
law was appropriate, plaintiffs cited case law regarding agency 
relationships completely unrelated to the relationships between 
defendants and the Ivorian farmers in the case at bar, and were 
thus deficient.222 
4. The Torture Victim Protection Act Claim 
In addition to their ATS claim, plaintiffs alleged that 
defendant corporations aided and abetted acts of torture under 
the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA).223  The TVPA forbids 
“[any] individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or 
color of law, of any foreign nation [to] subject[] an[other] 
individual to torture.”224  Because the TVPA is a statutory cause 






219 Id. at 1111–13. 
220 Id. at 1111–12. 
221 Id. at 1112. 
222 Id. at 1111–12.  
223 Id. at 1113–14. 
224 Id. at 1118 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2(a)(1)).  
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to be derived from federal law––unlike the ATS, which is 
analyzed under international law––and is thus a matter of 
statutory interpretation.225  However, the court refrained from 
conducting such an analysis and, instead, granted the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss the TVPA claim for the same 
reason it dismissed plaintiffs’ other claims: failure to establish 
plausible allegations of torture or any action under color of law, 
as required for a finding of liability under the TVPA.226  The fact 
that Congress had not extended TVPA liability to corporations 
further supported this decision.227 
5. The State-Law Claims 
Lastly, plaintiffs asserted four claims under California law: 
breach of contract, negligence, unjust enrichment, and unfair 
business practices.228  Due to an analogous Ninth Circuit 
decision, plaintiffs abandoned the breach of contract and 
negligence claims.229  With regard to the unjust enrichment 
claim, plaintiffs alleged that the farm’s reliance on forced labor 
greatly reduced labor costs, which allowed defendants to receive 
benefits by purchasing cocoa beans for such significantly low 
prices.230  The court also noted relevant case law that established 
that the lack of a prior relationship between a plaintiff and a 
defendant precluded claims of unjust enrichment because the 
relationship was too attenuated to support such a claim.231  In 
the case at bar, plaintiffs did not identify any relevant authority 
 
225 Id. at 1115–16. 
226 Id. at 1120. 
227 Id. at 1116. 
228 Id. at 1120.  
229 Id. at 1120–21; see Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 685 
(9th Cir. 2009), wherein the court held that corporations have no legal duty 
under the common law principles of negligence when it comes to the 
substandard labor principles of their suppliers. 
230 Nestle I, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1121 (quoting Pls.’ First Am. Compl., supra 
note 170, ¶¶ 90–91). 
231 Id. “The fact that one person benefits another is not, by itself, sufficient 
to require restitution.” First Nationwide Sav. v. Perry, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 173, 
176 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). “The person receiving the benefit is required to 
make restitution only if the circumstances are such that, as between the two 
individuals, it is unjust for the person to retain it.” Id. See, for example, Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d at 685, where the court concluded that, because the 
plaintiff was not an employee of the defendant, the plaintiff had no place to 
assert unjust enrichment based on the defendant’s alleged substandard labor 
practices.  
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to support their allegation that the long-term exclusive 
relationships between the defendant corporations and the 
Ivorian farmers were adequate to fulfill the “prior relationship” 
condition required for unjust enrichment claims.232  Accordingly, 
this claim was dismissed.233 
 
 Concerning the unfair business practice allegation, 
plaintiffs claimed that defendants “engaged in fraudulent and 
deceptive business practices by making materially false 
misrepresentations and omissions” to create the impression that 
they were addressing the problem of child slave labor when, in 
fact, they were not.234  Plaintiffs further argued that defendants 
engaged in unfair business practices by utilizing and supporting 
forced child labor.235  Ultimately, the court determined that 
plaintiffs did not express any theory, or provide any legal 
authority, through which the child slave plaintiffs were injured 
by defendants’ specific California-based conduct, nor was it 
explained how the alleged conduct––such as the false and 
misleading statements––adversely affected the child slave 
plaintiffs.236  Accordingly, this claim was also dismissed.237 
 
After this devastating loss and a full complaint dismissal, 
plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit in June of 2011.238 
C. First Appeal – Nestle II (9th Cir. 2014) 
The Ninth Circuit addressed three issues in this appeal:  
  
1. Did the district court err in determining that private 
corporations are not subject to civil tort liability under the ATS? 2. 
Did the district court err in failing to apply the federal common 
law standard for civil aiding and abetting liability to Plaintiffs’ 
ATS claims? 3. Even if international law applied to Plaintiffs’ 
 
232  Nestle I, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1122. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. (quoting Pls.’ First Am. Compl., supra note 170, ¶ 96). 
236 Id. at 1122–23. 
237 Id. at 1123. 
238 See generally Appellants’ Opening Br., Doe I v. Nestle U.S.A., Inc. 
(Nestle II), 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 2:05-cv-05133-SVW-JTL), 2011 
WL 2617616. 
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aiding and abetting claims, did the district court use the correct 
international law standard?239 
 
Plaintiffs consistently maintained their position that the 
defendant corporations aided and abetted slave labor “by 
providing financial and non-financial assistance to cocoa 
farmers in the Ivory Coast.”240  In opposition, defendants argued 
three main points: (1) there is no specific, universal, and 
obligatory norm preventing corporations from aiding and 
abetting slave labor; (2) plaintiffs’ complaint, again, failed to 
allege the actus reus and mens rea elements of the aiding and 
abetting claim; and (3) plaintiffs’ complaint improperly sought 
extraterritorial application of federal law contrary to Kiobel II.241 
1. The Alien Tort Claim 
Between 2010 and 2014, from the dismissal of plaintiffs’ 
amended complaint to the decision of their appeal, the Kiobel I, 
Kiobel II, and Sarei decisions were published.242  Sarei, a 
decision from the Ninth Circuit’s own en banc panel, and Kiobel 
II, a Supreme Court decision, were thus both binding precedent 
on this appeal.  In applying the norm-by-norm analysis adopted 
in Sarei, the Nestle II court concluded that the prohibition 
against slavery is a universal norm; however, it could not be 
asserted against the defendant corporations because the scope 
of the ATS did not (at this time) extend to corporations.243  
Notwithstanding this conclusion, the court acknowledged that 
corporations were not exempt from acts of enslavement and the 
prohibition of slavery applied to all actors––both state and non-
state––because it would be a contradiction to the humanitarian 
and moral nature of the prohibition to conclude that 
corporations are immune from liability of any form of slavery.244  
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order 
and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with 
 
239 Id. at 3–4. 
240 Doe I v. Nestle U.S.A., Inc. (Nestle II), 766 F.3d 1013, 1020 (9th Cir. 
2014). 
241 Id. 
242 See discussion supra Parts II(B)(i)–(ii), II(C)(ii), for further 
information on these cases. 
243 Nestle II, 766 F.3d at 1022. 
244 Id. 
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its opinion.245 
 
The Ninth Circuit refrained from addressing defendants’ 
extraterritoriality argument because, although Kiobel II had 
just been decided, too much was still left unanswered.246  It is 
common practice for courts to allow plaintiffs to amend their 
complaints when changes in the law occur.247  Accordingly, the 
Ninth Circuit directed plaintiffs to amend their complaint in 
light of the Kiobel II decision, which required plaintiffs to add 
allegations of activity that occurred within the United States to 
overcome defendants’ extraterritoriality argument.248  The 
Ninth Circuit recognized that such an amendment would be 
possible because, based on the record before them, certain 
conduct underlying plaintiffs’ claims had occurred in the United 
States.249  However, plaintiffs’ current complaint failed to 
adequately explain such conduct to sufficiently fulfill those 
allegations.250  For the district court to effectively and fully 
consider the accuracy of plaintiffs’ counter-arguments on 
remand, it was justified to allow amendment of their 
complaint.251  
2. The Aiding and Abetting Claim: Mens Rea 
Component 
On appeal, plaintiffs maintained their mens rea argument 
that the standard for an aiding and abetting claim was 
knowledge.252  Although the circuits remained divided as to the 
appropriate standard, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the 
history of the knowledge standard in other international 
tribunals.253  The court decided that it was not necessary for 
 
245 Id. at 1029.  
246 Id. at 1027–28. 
247 Id. at 1028. 




252 Id. at 1023. 
253 Id.; see generally Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, 
Judgment, ¶ 483 (Sept. 26, 2013), 
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/Appeal/1389/SCSL-03-01-A-
1389.pdf; Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Judgment, ¶ 137 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 9, 2007), 
34https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss2/4
2021 Doe v. Nestle, S.A. 295 
them to decipher which standard was appropriate because 
plaintiffs’ allegations nevertheless satisfied the more rigorous 
standard of purpose.254 
 
The Ninth Circuit read plaintiffs’ allegations in their favor 
and determined that a logical inference arose that the defendant 
corporations would likely supersede basic human welfare for 
increased revenues and intend to pursue any and all 
opportunities to reduce their costs for purchasing cocoa.255  The 
court felt that, driven by such a goal, it was probable that 
defendants encouraged child slavery because it was the cheapest 
form of labor available and would thus be most profitable, as 
plaintiffs alleged.256  Therefore, plaintiffs’ allegations did 
properly explain how the defendants benefited from the use of 
child slavery, how child slavery furthered defendants’ 
operational goals, and how defendants acted with purpose to 
further child slavery.257  Moreover, the court recognized that the 
defendants’ control over the Ivory Coast cocoa market further 
supported that they acted with purpose to facilitate child slavery 
because they did not use their control to stop it and continued to 
offer support and provide supplies that further enabled it.258  
The Ninth Circuit indicated that defendants maintained the 
means to prevent or decrease child slavery and, because they did 
not do so, their purpose in continuing child slavery was 
demonstrably supported.259  Despite these conclusions, the court 
recognized that doing business with child slave owners did not 
solely establish a purpose to support child slavery.260  But, 
specifically, it was defendants’ support of the use of child slavery 
to minimize production costs that clearly translated to the use 
of child slavery in order to pursue a goal of profitability—
 
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/blagojevic_jokic/acjug/en/blajok-jud070509.pdf; 
Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 205 (May 25, 
1999), https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-95-
1/trial-judgements/en/990521.pdf; Zyklon B Case, supra note 146. 




258 Id. at 1024–25. 
259 Id. at 1025. 
260 Id.  
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something that could only be done with purpose.261  The mens 
rea requirement was therefore satisfied and the district court’s 
decision on this issue was reversed.262 
3. The Aiding and Abetting Claim: Actus Reus 
Component 
The parties agreed, and as required by international law, 
that the assistance an aider and abettor provides to a principal 
actor must be substantial.263  However, the parties did not agree 
on whether such assistance must be “specifically directed” 
towards the commission of the crime.264  After reviewing the 
relevant international case law which supported and opposed 
the “specifically directed” requirement, the Ninth Circuit 
determined that “there [was] less focus on specific direction and 
more of an emphasis on the existence of a causal link between 
the defendants and the commission of the crime.”265  Despite this 
revelation, the court declined to adopt a particular actus reus 
standard for aiding and abetting under the ATS.266  Instead, the 
Ninth Circuit remanded the matter and held that plaintiffs 
should be afforded the opportunity to amend their actus reus 
claims and their ATS claim in light of two recent international 
decisions which further defined the actus reus standard for 
violations of international law, as discussed supra in Part 
III.A.267 
 
After Nestle II was decided in September of 2015, 
defendants submitted a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the 
 
261 Id. at 1025–26.  





267 Id. at 1026–27; see Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, 
Judgment, ¶ 390 (Sept. 26, 2013), 
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/Appeal/1389/SCSL-03-01-A-
1389.pdf, which explains that the aiding and abetting of violations of 
international law require a direct and specific link between the assistance and 
the commission of the crime; and Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, 
Judgment, ¶¶ 27, 126 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 
2013), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/acjug/en/130228_judgement.pdf,  
which explains that aiding and abetting conduct must have a substantial effect 
on the commission of the crime.  
36https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss2/4
2021 Doe v. Nestle, S.A. 297 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to 
determine:  
 
1. Whether a defendant is subject to suit under the ATS for aiding 
and abetting another person’s alleged violation of the law of 
nations based on allegations that the defendant intended to pursue 
a legitimate business objective while knowing (but not intending) 
that the objective could be advanced by the other person’s violation 
of international law. 2. Whether the “focus” test of Morrison v. 
National Australian Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 248 (2010), governs 
whether a proposed application of the ATS would be impermissibly 
extraterritorial under Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. 
Ct. 1659 (2013). 3. Whether there is a well-defined international-
law consensus that corporations are subject to liability for 
violations of the law of nations.268 
 
The petition was denied on January 11, 2016.269  At that point, 
this matter had been pending for six years, and the ILRF was 
preparing its third complaint. 
D. Nestle III (C.D. Cal. 2017) 
To sufficiently file a comprehensive amended complaint, 
plaintiffs moved for a limited jurisdictional discovery exchange 
in March of 2016, which was granted by the district court.270  
Subsequently, plaintiffs were faced by a second motion to 
dismiss premised on two main arguments: (1) the ATS could not 
be applied extraterritorially, which plaintiffs assert by including 
conduct that occurred outside the United States; and (2) 
plaintiffs still did not sufficiently allege the actus reus 
component of their aiding and abetting claim.271  In rendering a 
decision, the court applied the Morrison “focus test” to the claims 
at issue, notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit’s prior rejection of 
the test.272 
 
268 Pet. for a Writ of Cert. at i, Nestle U.S.A., Inc, v. Doe, 136 S. Ct. 798 
(2016) (No. 15-349), 2015 WL 5530188. 
269 Nestle U.S.A., Inc. v. Doe I, 577 U.S. 1062 (2016). 
270 See generally Mot. to Allow Pls. to Conduct Jurisdictional Disc., Doe I 
v. Nestle, S.A., 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 2:05-cv-05133-SVW-MRW), 
2016 WL 1546527. 
271 Defs. Mot. to Dismiss 2010, supra note 164, at 3–18. 
272 Nestle v. Nestle, S.A. (Nestle III), No. CV 05-5133-SVW-MRW, 2017 
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The court specified that the conduct at issue in this case was 
forced child labor and that the “focus” was defendants conduct 
that aided and abetted such forced child labor on the Ivorian 
Coast.273  The court conducted a further analysis by first 
isolating the relevant conduct that was alleged to constitute 
defendants’ aiding and abetting of forced child labor and then by 
determining if all relevant conduct took place outside the United 
States.274  The court reasoned that, if the answer to the latter 
question was yes, the case was to be dismissed.275  However, “[i]f 
some relevant conduct took place in the United States, it must 
‘touch and concern’ the United States with ‘sufficient force to 
displace the presumption against extraterritoriality.’”276  The 
court then addressed plaintiffs’ allegations concerning 
defendants’ conduct that “touched and concerned” the United 
States with sufficient force to displace the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.277  This was done in five separate parts:  
 
(1) U.S. based decision-making; (2) the provision of funds 
originating in the U.S.; (3) the U.S. companies furnishing 
“additional supplies” and “extensive training” to cocoa fanners [sic] 
in Cote d’Ivoire; (4) publishing statements in the U.S. that 
Defendants are against child slavery; and (5) lobbying efforts in 
the U.S. against a bill that Plaintiffs allege “would have required 
Defendants’ import cocoa to be “slave free.”278 
 
Because certain conduct by the defendants took place within the 
United States, the court was required to analyze further.279  In 
doing so, the court determined that the first three allegations 
were all ordinary activities of international businesses and did 
not “touch and concern” the United States with any weight more 
than mere citizenship.280  These particular allegations only 
 
WL 6059134, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2017). 
273 Id. at *3. 
274 Id. 
275 Id. 
276 Id. (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (Kiobel II), 569 U.S. 
108, 125 (2013)). 
277 Id. at *4. 
278 Id.  
279 Id.  
280 Id. 
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showed that defendants maintained business relationships with 
foreign parties and nothing suggested that defendants planned 
or directed the underlying violations in any way.281 
 
The court likewise did not agree with plaintiffs’ fourth 
allegation.282  Plaintiffs alleged that defendants published false 
assurances to consumers, which deluded them of the reality that 
defendants were actually supporting child slave labor.283  
Specifically, these publications stated that defendants were 
against child labor and that they held their suppliers to high 
standards, including compliance with the prohibition of child 
labor.284  The court determined these allegations were not 
relevant conduct under the “focus test” because they did not 
adequately explain how the statements were fraudulent, and the 
court therefore deemed them conclusory.285  As mentioned, the 
allegations did not show that the alleged publications assisted 
the defendants in committing forced child labor in any way, nor 
did plaintiffs provide any legal authority to support that 
publications that inform the public of an international human 
rights violation translates to the aiding and abetting of that 
violation.286 
 
Plaintiffs’ fifth allegation asserted that defendants conduct 
“touched and concerned” the United States by the millions of 
dollars spent within the United States “lobbying to destroy a bill 
that . . . would have required Defendants’ imported cocoa to be 
‘slave free.’”287  However, similar to plaintiffs’ first four claims, 
plaintiffs did not plausibly allege how such lobbying efforts 
specifically aided and abetted the Ivorian farmers to sufficiently 
displace the presumption.288  As such, the court determined that 
plaintiffs’ allegations were not relevant conduct under the “focus 
test.”289 
 
281 Id. at *5. 
282 Id. at *5–6.  
283 Id. at *5. 
284 Id. 
285 Id. 
286 Id. at *5–6. 
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 Finally, the court concluded that the only nexus between 
plaintiffs’ claims and the United States was the fact that 
defendants were United States corporations, which was not a 
sufficient factor.290  The court did not find, nor did plaintiffs 
provide, any case law to support the argument that the large size 
of defendant corporations was to be considered a relevant factor 
under this, or any, ATS test.291  The court ultimately found that 
plaintiffs’ complaint sought a barred extraterritorial application 
of the ATS.292  As a result of this finding, the court did not reach 
the merits of plaintiffs’ actus reus claims.293  Defendants’ motion 
to dismiss was granted without leave to amend.294  The court did 
not grant plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint because 
plaintiffs were already given ample opportunities, among other 
procedural aspects, to adequately adjust their complaint.295  The 
court determined that further amendment would not serve any 
fruitful purpose.296  Nevertheless, plaintiffs refused to back 
down, and again appealed to the Ninth Circuit.297  By that time, 
litigation had entered its twelfth year. 
E. Second Appeal – Nestle IV (9th Cir. 2019) 
Since the Ninth Circuit decided Nestle II, the Supreme 
Court published the Jesner decision, which created a shift in the 
“legal landscape” of the ATS and required portions of the Nestle 
II decision to be reconsidered.298  The decision was divided into 
four main parts: (1) corporate liability post-Jesner; (2) the 
extraterritorial ATS claim; (3) the aiding and abetting claim; 
and (4) plaintiffs standing to bring such claims.299 
 
290 Id. at *7–8. 
291 Id. at *8. 
292 Id. at *1. 
293 Id. 
294 Id. at *9. 
295 Id. at *8. 
296 Id. 
297 Doe v. Nestle, S.A. (Nestle IV), 929 F.3d 623, 639 (9th Cir. 2018). 
298 Id. at 639, 642. 
299 Id. at 639–42. 
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1. Corporate Liability Post-Jesner 
In Nestle II, the Ninth Circuit held that the prohibition of 
slavery was universal, and thus “applicable to all actors, 
including corporations.”300  However, since then, the Supreme 
Court explicitly held in Jesner that foreign corporations could 
not be sued under the ATS.301  Accordingly, Nestle II’s holding 
was null as to the foreign defendant corporations but upheld as 
applied to the domestic defendant corporations.302 
2. The Extraterritoriality Claim 
  Defendants main argument was that the court was 
required to use the “focus test,” and the court agreed.303  With 
regard to the first step in the extraterritoriality analysis, as 
established in Kiobel II, the ATS maintained a presumption 
against extraterritoriality, and nothing in the statute rebutted 
that presumption.304  The next step in the analysis, the court 
determined, necessitated an inquiry into “a domestic application 
of the statute,” which required a look into its focus.305  
Defendants asserted that conduct occurring within the United 
States was immaterial because the focus of extraterritoriality 
should be on the location where the principal offense or injury 
occurred, rather than where the aiding and abetting took 
place.306  The court disagreed and held that “[t]he focus of the 
ATS is not limited to principal offenses.”307  The court then 
proceeded to determine whether there was any domestic conduct 
relevant to plaintiffs’ ATS claim.308  In doing so, the court 
concluded that the conduct mentioned in plaintiffs’ complaint 
was both specific and domestic because it “paint[ed] a picture of 
overseas slave labor that defendants perpetuated from 
headquarters in the United States.”309  Thus, the court held that 
 
300 Id. at 639 (quoting Doe I v. Nestle U.S.A., Inc. (Nestle II), 766 F.3d 
1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
301 Id.  
302 Id. 
303 Id. at 640. 
304 Id. 
305 Id. at 640–41. 
306 Id. at 641. 
307 Id. 
308 Id. at 642. 
309 Id.  
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this “narrow set of domestic conduct [was] relevant to the ATS’s 
focus.”310 
3. The Aiding and Abetting Claim 
The Ninth Circuit decided it was unnecessary to rule on the 
aiding and abetting claim in light of the way Jesner shifted the 
legal framework of ATS liability, which affected plaintiffs’ 
complaint.311  Plaintiffs conceded, however, and the Ninth 
Circuit agreed, that it remained problematic that the complaint 
discussed the remaining defendants as a single perpetrator.312  
Moreover, because of Jesner, it was not possible, based on the 
current record, that any culpable conduct actionable under the 
ATS could be connected to the defendants.313  Just as the court 
stated in Nestle II, “[i]t is common practice to allow plaintiffs to 
amend their pleadings to accommodate changes in the law . . . 
.”314  Despite the acknowledged delay this decision presented, the 
court nevertheless determined it was best to allow plaintiffs to 
amend their complaint to remove the foreign defendants and to 
specify which potentially liable party was responsible for what 
culpable conduct.315 
4. Plaintiffs’ Standing to Bring Their Claims 
Defendants argued that plaintiffs’ lacked Article III 
standing because they failed to allege an actual and specified 
injury that was connected to the disputed conduct and could be 
redressed by a positive judicial outcome.316  The court rejected 
this argument, discussing the appropriate remedies such as 
compensatory damages or sanctions, which would reduce the 
risk of forced child labor continuing.317  The court further 
highlighted that plaintiffs satisfactorily alleged traceability to 
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allegations against Cargill.318  Thus, despite the deficient 
allegations against Nestle, the court acknowledged the 
sufficiency of the claims to be re-pleaded.319 
 
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s 
decision of Nestle III and remanded the matter back to the 
district court with permission for plaintiffs to amend their 
complaint per the Jesner decision and its opinion.320 
F. Petition for Certiorari – Nestle V (2020) 
After the Ninth Circuit decided Nestle IV, Nestle U.S.A., Inc. 
filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari on September 25, 2019, 
including the following questions presented: 
 
1. Whether an aiding and abetting claim against a domestic 
corporation brought under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. §1350, 
may overcome the extraterritoriality bar where the claim is based 
on allegations of general corporate activity in the United States 
and where plaintiffs cannot trace the alleged harms, which 
occurred abroad at the hands of unidentified foreign actors, to that 
activity. 2. Whether the Judiciary has the authority under the 
Alien Tort Statute to impose liability on domestic corporations. 321 
 
Plaintiffs, now respondents, filed an opposition on December 12, 
2019, and petitioners filed their reply shortly thereafter on 
December 23, 2019.322   On January 13, 2020, the Supreme Court 
invited the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views 
of the United States on this matter.323  On July 2, 2020, the 
Supreme Court granted Nestle U.S.A., Inc.’s petition, 
consolidating it with a similar petition filed by Cargill, Inc.324  
 
318 Id. 
319 Id. at 642–43. 
320 Id. at 643. 
321 Pet. for a Writ of Cert. at i, Nestle U.S.A., Inc., v. Doe I, 141 S. Ct. 188 
(2020) (No. 19-416), 2019 WL 4747982. 
322 See generally Br. in Opp., Nestle U.S.A., Inc, v. Doe I, 141 S. Ct. 188 
(2020) (No. 19-416), 2019 WL 6840721; Reply Br. in Supp. of Cert., Nestle 
U.S.A., Inc, v. Doe I, 141 S. Ct. 188 (2020) (No. 19-416) 2019 WL 7212365. 
323 Nestle U.S.A., Inc. v. Doe I, 140 S. Ct. 912 (2020). As of January 5, 
2020, twenty-five amicus briefs had been filed in connection with these 
petitions.  
324 Nestle U.S.A., Inc. v. Doe I, 141 S. Ct. 188 (argued Dec. 1, 2020); 
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This case had then entered its fifteenth year of litigation. 
V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should affirm the decision of the Ninth 
Circuit, allowing this case to be remanded so that plaintiffs can 
properly amend their complaint to be consistent with all prior 
decisions.  For purposes of the final portion of this case note, the 
questions granted by the Supreme Court will not be addressed.  
Plaintiffs’ success on remand will rely solely on their ability to 
construct a plausible complaint that lists each domestic 
corporations’ culpable U.S. conduct that is specifically linked to 
the furtherance of the commission of forced labor, child labor, 
torture, or cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment.  By 
removing the foreign defendants, plaintiffs have averted any 
future defenses regarding corporate liability under the ATS.  In 
Nestle II, the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs satisfied the 
purpose standard with regard to the mens rea component of their 
claim, and, in Nestle IV, the Ninth Circuit held that the narrow 
set of domestic conduct provided by plaintiffs was relevant to the 
ATS’s focus.  Accordingly, the final challenge plaintiffs must 
overcome is satisfying the actus reus component of their aiding 
and abetting claim in conjunction with the ICTY’s Taylor and 
Perišić decisions, as recommended by the court. 
 
Concerning financial assistance, plaintiffs must show, or at 
least create the plausible inference, that the financial assistance 
provided by defendants to the Ivorian farmers was unrelated to 
a commercial purpose.  Asserting a noncommercial purpose can 
be accomplished through a showing of a gratuitous gesture on 
behalf of the defendants to specifically incentivize the farmers to 
keep cocoa costs down.  If plaintiffs can show that the most 
logical way to keep cocoa costs down is through the use of forced 
child labor or the like, they have ascertained the link between 
the financial assistance and the commission of the crime.  
Additionally, plaintiffs could show additional steps taken by the 
defendants in providing such financial assistance to try and 
convey the inference that more than the average contractual 
payments were being made to the farmers in reliance on 
continued low cocoa costs by use of forced child labor. 
 
Cargill, Inc. v. Doe I, 141 S. Ct. 184 (argued Dec. 1, 2020). 
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While certain farming supplies––such as chemicals, 
fertilizers, and power tools––may be dangerous, they are not 
criminal.  Supplies must be specifically designed for an unlawful 
purpose to support a close causal link to the principal crime.325  
For the defendants’ to be found liable for aiding and abetting the 
Ivorian farmers of child labor, forced labor, torture, or cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment, as plaintiffs contend, they 
must show that such crimes were perpetrated with the supplies 
provided by defendants, that defendants provided such supplies 
to further the criminal acts, and that the supplies had a 
substantial effect on the criminal behavior.  Plaintiffs must 
establish which materials were used by the Ivorian farmers in 
the commission of such crimes and whether those materials 
were supplied by defendants.  Plaintiffs allege that these child 
workers are tortured and subjected to cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment; thus, it is probable that some sort of 
instruments are involved to implement such conduct.  If 
plaintiffs can show that defendants supplied any tools or 
chemicals not regularly used in the normal course of cocoa bean 
farming and can only logically be inferred as a means of threat 
and/or intimidation, they will have a better shot at successfully 
alleging this claim. 
 
With regard to technical assistance and training, plaintiffs 
similarly must show that such technical assistance and training 
were provided by defendants for the direct purpose of assisting 
in the furtherance of the farmers’ forced labor, child labor, 
torture, or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.  Instances 
where courts have found the provision of training and technical 
assistance to have had a substantial effect on a particular 
criminal act occurred when such training and assistance was 
customized to facilitate criminal acts.326  Plaintiffs must show 
that the Ivorian farmers were trained by defendants to utilize 
forms of torturous labor, or the like, for some benefit that 
incentivized them or motivated them to continue utilizing it.  If 
 
325 See, for example, Zyklon B Case, supra note 146, which discusses the 
defendant’s supplying of poison gas used to kill people. 
326 See, for example, S. Afr. Apartheid Litig. v. Daimler, A.G., 617 F. Supp. 
2d 228, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), wherein a database was specifically customized 
to further criminal conduct. 
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plaintiffs can show that defendants trained the farmers to only 
employ children, maintain an inhuman work environment, 
and/or use forceful and degrading techniques, their complaint 
will raise the inference of a direct link between defendants’ 
training and the criminal acts that had a substantial effect. 
 
Alternatively, plaintiffs may also succeed with an allegation 
that defendants failed to correct the inhuman working 
conditions by omitting to correct or properly train the farmers to 
preserve a healthy and suitable work environment, especially if 
they can show that the defendants knew how awful the farms’ 
working environments actually were.  For plaintiffs to 
successfully allege that technical assistance had a substantial 
effect or direct link to the crime at issue, they must prove that 
defendants customized or required the use of some form of 
software or database which provided the farmers with 
information on keeping cocoa bean costs low and that the only 
way the farmers knew or were able to sustain such low costs, as 
directed by the software or database, was through the use of 
child slave labor. 
 
Lastly, the district court concluded in Nestle I that moral 
support and tacit encouragement and approval, the theory under 
which plaintiffs’ claim of failure to exercise economic leverage 
falls, is not well-defined and universally accepted as required by 
Sosa to be actionable.  However, this conclusion should be 
reconsidered.  The court concluded four noteworthy points 
regarding this area of law.  First, there is a convincing argument 
that defendants did maintain a legal duty to act.  Defendant 
corporations were all obligated to comply with both Convention 
182 and The Harken-Engel Protocol.  Furthermore, 
notwithstanding the illegality of slavery in the United States, 
child labor is heavily regulated.  Therefore, multi-billion-dollar 
companies, such as defendants, should be legally obligated to 
refrain from maintaining any exclusive buyer/supplier 
relationships with businesses or farms that knowingly or 
recklessly use any form of labor not lawfully permitted within 
the United States.  If defendants threatened to end to their 
buyer/supplier relationship with the Ivorian farmers due to the 
farmers’ failure to comply with Convention 182 and/or the 
guidelines outlined in the Harkin-Engle Protocol, it is probable 
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that the farmers would have reconsidered in order to sustain 
such an economically advantageous business relationship to 
them.  Thus, defendants should be considered to have a legal 
duty to end, or attempt to end, their business relationships with 
the Ivorian farmers for their continued use of child slave labor 
and, because they did not, they should be liable for aiding and 
abetting same. 
 
Second, just because aiding and abetting by way of moral 
support and tacit encouragement and approval is rare or even 
non-existent with regard to the Alien Tort Statute, that does not 
mean the court should refrain from holding defendants liable.  
Our courts have expanded the scope of the ATS since Filartiga 
in 1980 and they should continue to do so today, especially when 
a universal prohibition is at issue, such as the issue involved in 
the case at bar.  If the Ninth Circuit explicitly stated that the 
absence of precedent regarding corporate liability under the ATS 
did not automatically imply that it was a legal impossibility, the 
same standard should thus apply with aiding and abetting by 
way of moral support and tacit encouragement and approval. 
 
In contrast with the court’s conclusions, I believe plaintiffs 
satisfy the tacit approval and encouragement theory since there 
is a strong argument that defendants held a position of 
administrative authority over the Ivorian farmers.  Plaintiffs 
have previously alleged that defendants participate in numerous 
site visits to the Ivorian farms, which, with sufficient proof, 
should fulfill the requirement of a physical presence if evidence 
can be brought to prove that a high quantity of visits occurred 
each year.  Moreover, it is unquestionable that defendants 
maintain a position of administrative authority over the Ivorian 
farmers because they provide all the necessary supplies to keep 
the farms up and running, they maintain substantial economic 
leverage over the farmers, and they have great influence over 
the cocoa farm industry as a whole on the Ivory Coast. 
 
Defendants or defendants’ agents cannot successfully argue 
that they were unaware of the farms’ labor uses if they or their 
agents were physically present on the farms via their site visits.  
Such presence clearly would have made them aware of the 
apparent labor conditions.  Further, the Ivorian farmers were 
47
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obviously aware of such a presence, making them conscious of 
defendants’ knowledge of the labor conditions utilized on the 
farms. Thus, a plausible conclusion can be made that the 
farmers inferred defendants’ approval of these conditions due to 
their non-interference with the farm’s labor conditions during or 
after these site visits occurred.  Ultimately, with the appropriate 
amendments, plaintiffs should likely finally have their day in 
court, and the global prohibition on child slavery will be one step 
closer to success. 
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